Tax capacity and growth in the Asia-Pacific region by Tovar Jalles, João
 









  Abstract 
 
In this paper, we estimate short- and long-term tax buoyancy for 30 Asian-Pacific countries during 
1980-2017 using recent panel techniques. Using Mean Group estimators, we found that the short-
run buoyancy is statistically not different from one, while the long-run buoyancy is statistically 
larger than one. In 11 out of 30 countries, growth has improved fiscal sustainability over time, 
while in only 4 out of 30 countries the tax system has acted as a good automatic stabilizer. Results 
are robust to the estimation with alternative estimators, the inclusion of inflation and tax rates. We 
uncovered that buoyancies increased in magnitude and significance over time. Lastly, resorting to 
nonlinear estimations of short-run buoyancies contingent on the phase of the business cycle, we 
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The Addis Ababa Action Agenda in 2015 set up seven key actions one of which was to mobilize 
more revenues domestically. The need for additional resources is paramount, particularly in 
developing and emerging countries, to finance the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. The 
2019 UN´s Financing for Sustainable Development Report shows “that enhancing domestic 
revenues through tax reform and reducing illicit financial flows will provide much needed fiscal 
space for governments to fund their development programs”. Indeed, any tax system’s main 
function is to bring in sufficient revenue to meet growing public sector requirements and over time, 
tax systems across different countries have been revamped, restructured and reformed with the 
objective of maximizing tax revenues.  
To determine if a country has made efforts at increasing tax revenue over a period, one needs 
to introduce a critical ingredient of a tax system, the so-called tax buoyancy (Asher, 1989).1 The 
buoyancy degree of a tax system reveals the total response of tax revenue to changes in national 
income as well as “discretionary” (or non-automatic) changes in tax policies. Despite being closely 
related to buoyancy, the concept of elasticity of the tax system measures the responsiveness of tax 
revenue to changes in national income resulting from “discretionary” modifications in the tax 
structure, that is, keeping all other parameters (including tax legislation) constant (Skeete et al., 
2003). When the elasticity of revenue sources is low (due to e.g. low base, evasion or avoidance), 
governments raise additional resources through discretionary measures. 2  Hence, tax revenue 
growth comes through high buoyancy rather than through elasticity.3 
A large buoyancy is a desirable feature of a tax system: in addition to augmenting the revenue 
productivity, it fosters overall fiscal operations by mitigating undesired cyclical movements. 4 
 
1 Two of the first set of papers making an attempt to measure the tax effort in developing countries was done by Lotz 
and Morss (1967) and subsequently by Chelliah et al (1975). 
2 Lacking information on discretionary measures for the panel of Asian countries studied in this paper and under the 
assumption that the effects of these changes on revenues cancel each other out over time, then tax buoyancy is 
estimated via a regression of the log of tax revenue on the log of GDP. This is the approach followed in this paper. 
3 In some sense, elasticity is more appropriate to use to estimate the impact of, say, an unexpected decline in the tax 
base (owing, for example, to a natural disaster) on revenues, or the increase in, say, personal income tax revenues over 
time if brackets are not adjusted and deductions allowances remain the same. Buoyancy on the other hand, more 
appropriately measures past revenue developments or the combined effects of a package of reforms. 
4 A buoyancy of one would imply that an extra percent of GDP would increase tax revenue also by one percent, thus 
leaving the tax-to-GDP ratio unchanged. A tax buoyancy exceeding one, however would increase tax revenue by more 
than GDP and potentially lead to reductions in the deficit ratio. If buoyancy is low, discretionary changes may make 




Hence, the assessment of tax buoyancy is an important part of a macro model of any economy. 
Moreover, as in many other emerging and developing countries, the public finance sector in several 
Asian countries is the focal point of many of the conflicts and challenges posed by economic 
development. The domestic resource mobilization imperative to improve the redistributive, 
allocative and stabilization functions of the government (Musgrave, 1969) is greatly compromised 
by these challenges. Several efforts aimed at obtaining optimal fiscal policies with emphasis on 
the role of taxation, as an instrument of economic development, have been implemented over time 
(Ndikumana and Abderrahim, 2010).  
A detailed study of tax buoyancy in Asia is relevant for multiple reasons: i) for purposes related 
to revenue forecasting; ii) to analyze the responsiveness and stabilizing role of tax systems; iii) 
and to examine the progressivity of a tax system to address equity considerations. In other words, 
by assessing country-specific degrees of tax buoyancy, one can ascertain if the government is 
keeping track on tax mobilization with economic activity. Moreover, estimation of individual tax 
buoyancies helps shedding light on weaknesses and strengths of the system and guides fiscal 
authorities in identifying those taxes which are income elastic or not and, therefore, aim at directing 
their efforts at the more elastic ones to raise overall tax revenue.  
Tax buoyancy can also differ between the short- and the long-run. The former is linked to the 
stabilization role of fiscal policy. In fact, if the short-run tax buoyancy is larger than one, then the 
tax system can be considered as a good automatic stabilizer, by smoothing economic activity 
directly.5 Contrarily, long-run buoyancy is a steady-state concept and it is of relevance to assess 
the effect of economic growth on long-term fiscal sustainability.6 This is particularly relevant in 
the context of the recent Global Financial Crisis which led governments around the world to make 
use of fiscal policy to counter the fall in aggregate demand with the undesirable consequence of 
growing public indebtedness and endangering the sustainability of public finances. In the face of 
sustainability problems and with low tax elasticities/buoyancies, engaging in such demand-
boosting policy stance is not advisable. Today´s need for government´s greater (fiscal) 
accountability, discipline and effectiveness, has led many practioneers and academics to revive the 
 
5 Fiscal stabilizers reduce output fluctuations because some components of fiscal accounts react automatically to the 
cycle, increasing public deficits in recessions and decreasing them in expansions. For a recent contribution on the 
stabilization role of fiscal policy see Furceri and Jalles (2018). 
6 Sustainable fiscal policies are those that can be continued indefinitely without any change in the policy stance and 




debate around the best policy options at a time a budget is designed. In normal times, fiscal 
discussions are centered around which taxes and/or spending items to decrease and/or increase 
(see e.g. Jha et al., 2014). In this context, it is paramount to understand how different taxes behave 
with economic activity, particularly around business cycle´s turning points. 
This paper contributes to the literature by being the first to estimate both short and long-run tax 
revenue buoyancies for 30 Asian-Pacific countries over a relatively long-time period (1980-2017) 
by means of Mean and Pooled Mean Group estimators. Not only are short and long-run tax 
buoyancy estimates provided for total tax revenue but also for four tax categories, namely personal 
income tax, corporate income tax, taxes on goods and services and trade taxes which, in 2017, 
accounted for more than 80 percent of tax revenues in these countries. In addition, this paper 
studies how business cycle’s turning points impact buoyancy estimates. These 30 Asian-Pacific 
countries have, on average, made progress in mobilizing more taxes as its ratio to GDP has been 
rising since the early 2000´s, despite the fall after the Global Financial Crises in the more recent 
period (Figure 1, panel a). The growth rate of nominal tax revenues and nominal GDP has been 
highly correlated in this group of countries (correlation coefficient of 85 percent), sometimes 
higher, sometimes lower, making it difficult to certainly claim that average tax buoyancy has been 
greater than one over this period (Figure 1, panel b).7 
 
Figure 1. Tax Revenues (percent of GDP) (panel a) and Growth in Nominal GDP and 
Tax Revenue (percent) (panel b) in Asian-Pacific Countries, 1980-2017 
a)  b)  
   
Note: In panel a) blue line denotes tax revenues in percent of GDP. In panel b) blue line denotes the growth rate of nominal tax 
revenue; red line denotes the growth rate of nominal GDP. 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
7 Nominal GDP grew on average 1.6 percent per year while nominal tax revenues grew on average 1.3 percent per 
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On average, in this group of countries tax revenues have been increasing over the last decades 
particularly driven by corporate income tax and taxes on goods and services. Using Mean Group 
estimators, we found that the short-run buoyancy is statistically not different from one, while the 
long-run buoyancy is statistically larger than one (driven by a high corporate income tax 
buoyancy). In 11 out of 30 countries, growth has improved fiscal sustainability over time. In only 
4 out of 30 countries the tax system has acted as a good automatic stabilizer as evidenced by short-
run buoyancies statistically larger than one. Results are robust to the estimation with alternative 
estimators, the inclusion of inflation and tax rates. We also uncovered that buoyancies increased 
in magnitude and significance over time. Finally, resorting to nonlinear estimations of short-run 
buoyancies contingent on the phase of the business cycle, we find that buoyancy is generally larger 
during recessions than in normal times. One key novelty in this last point is the manner in which 
we identify recessions based on a newly computed measure of the output gap for these countries 
that relied on the recent filtering technique suggested by Hamilton (2018). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 
develops the conceptual and econometric approach. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 discusses 
our empirical results. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Estimates of revenues elasticities abound in the literature, both for groups of countries (mostly 
advanced due to data availability and quality issues) and for individual countries.  
Combining developed and developing countries, Choudhry (1979) was one of the first authors 
to estimate the elasticity of tax revenue. He focused on the United States, United Kingdom, 
Malaysia and Kenya. The overall elasticities were found to be 1.04 and 1.24 for the United States 
and United Kingdom, respectively. Malaysia and Kenya had slightly higher elasticities of 1.57 and 
1.32 respectively. 
Later, while Bouthevillan et al. (2001) inspected euro area countries, Giorno et al. (1995) and 
Girouard and Andre (2005) estimated revenue elasticities for OECD countries. More recently, 
Belinga et al. (2014) looked at short and long-run coefficients for a panel of OECD countries 
between 1965-2012. The authors found that for aggregate tax revenues, short-run tax buoyancy 
did not significantly differ from one in most countries; however, it increased since the 1980s 




Princen (2015) provided panel estimations of dynamic tax elasticities for the EU. Deli et al. (2018) 
found that tax revenue estimates were not different from unity while personal income tax 
buoyancies were smaller than one in a sample of 25 OECD countries between 1965-2015. A paper 
by Lagravinese et al. (2020) finds both short- and long-run buoyancy in OECD countries to be less 
than one – a result that is starkly different from earlier studies.  
For non-OECD countries, most studies cover the developing regions of Africa and Asia and 
perform, generally, single country analysis. Focused in Africa examples include Osoro and 
Leuthold (1994) and Twerefou et al. (2010). Osoro (1995) established that the elasticity of the 
overall tax system in Tanzania declined from 0.85 in 1970 to 0.78 in 1980 attributed to an exchange 
rate depreciation. A similar finding was found by Chipeta (1998) for the case of Nigeria. Some 
other authors looked at the impact of specific tax reforms on tax elasticity. For instance, Ayoki et 
al. (2005) found that reforms in Malawi positively impacted directed taxes as evidenced by an 
increase in the tax-to-income elasticity index from 0.71 to 1.08. More recently, Bruckner (2011) 
estimated the tax revenue of several sub-Saharan African countries using a novel instrumental 
variable approach. He suggested the existence of high tax revenue elasticities in the region. In 
contrast, Twerefou et al. (2012) showed that the overall tax and individual tax categories in Ghana 
were not buoyant in the short-run with the exception of personal income tax. Bekoe, Danquah and 
Senahey (2016) also focusing on Ghana between 1970-2013 showed that tax reforms in the country 
positive influenced the overall tax structure as evidenced by more than unit buoyancies and 
elasticities. 
Focusing specifically in Asia, Thac and Lim (1984) examined Papua New Guinea’s tax 
performance and estimated both tax elasticities and tax buoyancies for different tax categories 
between 1965-1977. They found that for total tax revenue the elasticity coefficient was estimated 
to be 1.32 while the buoyancy coefficient was estimated to be 1.85. Shome (1988) discussed the 
impediments to an automatic response of tax revenue to economic growth by focusing on 
developing Asian countries. He then argued that there was some built-in inflexibility in raising the 
elasticity of a typical Asian tax system.  Bilquees (2004) studied the elasticity and buoyancy of the 
tax system in Pakistan using the Divisia Index method over the 1974-2004 period. He showed a 
total tax buoyancy and elasticity after the reform as 0.92 and 0.88, respectively and concluded that 
the overall adoption of discretionary tax measures has been significant in generating more revenues 




Timsina (2007) applied time series techniques to reveal that Nepal’s tax system was inelastic (less 
than unity) between 1975-2005. However, buoyancy was higher than one reflecting that the bulk 
of revenue collection emanated from discretionary changes in the tax policy rather than from 
automatic responses. Jayawickrama (2008) focused on the Sri Lanka case since the 1990s to 
concluded that both the low buoyancy of corporate income tax and the susceptibility of goods and 
services tax to unexpected non-structural shocks were the main causes of the declining revenue to 
GDP ratio. Yousuf and Huq (2012) studied elasticity and buoyancy of major tax categories in 
Bangladesh are found that most of the growth in revenues was achieved due to discretionary 
changes instead of automatic growth. 
For this review it is clear that a panel inspection of the Asian region that includes an analysis 
of both short and long-run buoyancies is currently absent which is the gap this paper aims to bridge. 
Moreover, by focusing on the Asian-Pacific region we are able to include some islands and smaller 
states commonly ignored in empirical studies. 
 
3. Conceptual and Empirical Methodology 
 
The buoyancy of a tax system is measured by the proportional change in total tax revenue with 







     (1) 
where T is total tax revenue, Y is GDP and ∂ denotes continuous changes in the variables.  
The buoyancy of a tax can be obtained by a linear regression equation of the form: 
𝑇 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑌 + 𝜀    (2) 
where α is a constant, β is the marginal rate of taxation, ε is an error term and the rest of variables 
are defined as before. Since 𝜕𝑇/𝜕𝑌 = 𝛽, it follows that buoyancy (or elasticity) 𝐵𝑇,𝑌 = 𝛽(𝑌/𝑇). 
This method involves the estimation of β and calculation of the term (Y/T) by averaging Y and T 
over the sample period in order to eliminate cyclical influences.  An alternative method, which is 
followed in this study, is to express equation (2) in exponential form as: 
𝑇 = 𝛼𝑌𝛽𝜀      (3) 




𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑇 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑌 + 𝜀    (4) 
In this case, the estimate of β corresponds to tax buoyancy.  
An important dimension when referring to buoyancy is time. Over the short run, buoyancies 
can be different from one, and they can be different across revenue items.8 However, over the long 
run it is expected that buoyancy be equal to one. If not, at least on theoretical grounds, there would 
come a point where revenues exceed 100 percent of their base. Even though the time dimension 
of the dataset allows us to run individual regressions, we rather fully exploit the panel dimension 
for three main reasons: first, it enables to by-pass the difficulty related to short-spanned time series; 
second, tests are more powerful than the conventional ones: third, cross-section information 
reduces the probability of a spurious regression (Barnerjee, 1999).9  
The time-series properties of our data play an important role.10 We conjecture that the 
potential bias resulting from estimating buoyancy coefficients using fixed-effects models is the 
result of nonstationary errors, which are introduced into the estimating equation by the imposition 
of parameter homogeneity. Hence, careful modelling of short-run dynamics requires a slightly 
different econometric approach, relative to equation (4) derived in the previous section. Consider 
the equation: 
 
 𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝑖 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑇 (5) 
 
where 𝛽 is an unknown (buoyancy) parameter to be estimated, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denote the tax revenue variable 
(in nominal terms) and 𝑥𝑖𝑡  denotes nominal GDP. 𝜇𝑖, 𝜂𝑡  are time and country fixed effects, 
respectively.𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the model specific error term satisfying the standard assumptions. We then 
assume that (5) represents the equilibrium which holds in the long-run, but that the dependent 
variable may deviate from its path in the short-run. There are often good reasons to expect the 
long-run equilibrium relationships between variables to be similar across groups of countries, due 
 
8 For example, adjustments to revenue brackets for the computation of personal income taxes may lag household 
income development. Indexation of deduction allowances may be different from inflation. These factors would explain 
a strong response of revenues to economic development over the short-run. 
9 Recall that t-ratios are invalid for the estimations if error terms are nonstationary. 
10 Results of first (Im et al., 1997) and second generation (Pesaran, 2007) panel integration tests suggest that we cannot 




e.g. to budget constraints, fiscal rules or even common technologies influencing them in a similar 
way. We assume that the long-run relationship is composed of a country-specific level and a set 
of common factors with country-specific factor loadings. The parameters of (5) can be obtained 
via more recent panel data methods. Here, we consider the Mean Group (MG) estimator (Pesaran 
and Smith, 1995) and the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator, which involves both pooling and 
averaging (Pesaran et al., 1999). The MG approach consists of estimating separate regressions for 
each country and computing averages of the country-specific coefficients (Evans, 1997; Lee et al., 
1997). This allows for heterogeneity of all the parameters. In contrast, the MG estimator allows 
the intercepts, short-run coefficients and error variances to differ freely across groups, but the long-
run coefficients are constrained to be the same. The group-specific short-run coefficients and the 
common long-run coefficients are computed by the pooled maximum likelihood estimation. Both 
these estimators are appropriate for analyzing dynamic panels with large time and cross-section 
dimensions, and they have the advantage of accommodating both the long-run equilibrium and the 
possibly heterogeneous dynamic adjustment process.  
We base our panel analysis on the unrestricted error correction ARDL(p,q) representation: 
 






+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡, 
𝑖 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑇 (6) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡is a scalar dependent tax revenue variable, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the 𝑘 × 1 vector of regressors for group 
I (which includes GDP but also other potential controls), 𝜇𝑖represents the fixed effects, 𝜑𝑖is a 
scalar coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. 𝛽′𝑖’s is the 𝑘 × 1vector of coefficients on 
explanatory variables, 𝜆𝑖𝑗 ’s are scalar coefficients on lagged first-differences of dependent 
variables, and 𝛾𝑖𝑗’s are 𝑘 × 1 coefficient vectors on first-differences of explanatory variables and 
their lagged values. We assume that the disturbances 𝜉𝑖𝑡’s in the ARDL model are independently 
distributed across i and t, with zero means and constant variances. Equation (6) means that 




variable, and a distributed lag of order q of GDP.11 Assuming that 𝜑𝑖 < 0 for all i, there exists a 
long-run relationship between 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 such as: 
 
 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃′𝑖 𝑙𝑛 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡, 𝑖 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑇 (7) 
 
where 𝜃′𝑖 = −𝛽𝑖′/𝜑𝑖is the 𝑘 × 1 vector of the long-run coefficients, and 𝜂𝑖𝑡’s are stationary with 
possible non-zero means. Equation (6) can be rewritten as: 
 
 𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖𝜂𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗 +
𝑝−1
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝛾′𝑖𝑗𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑞−1
𝑞=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡, 𝑖 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 =
1,2, . . . , 𝑇 (8) 
 
where 𝜂𝑖𝑡−1is the error correction term given by (7), hence 𝜑𝑖 is the error correction coefficient 
measuring the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.12  
 
4. Data  
 
We use annual tax revenue data for an unbalanced panel of 30 Asian-Pacific countries between 
1980 and 2017.13 In addition to aggregate tax revenue data (which we use excluding social security 
contributions), we focus on four specific tax categories that in the last year considered, 2017, 
account for more than 80 percent of tax revenues. We look specifically at: i) Personal Income Tax 
(PIT); ii) Corporate Income Tax (CIT); Taxes on Goods and Services (TGS); Trade Taxes (TT).14 
These come from the World Bank´s World Development Indicators. Data on GDP and inflation 
(CPI and deflator based) are retrieved from IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. Summary 
statistics are displayed in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
11 The Bayesian Information Criteria was used to choose the optimal lag length and we found it to be equal to 1 for 
both p,q. 
12 Applied to a panel setting, this econometric approach borrows from the time series literature on vector error 
correction models (VECM). A VECM has the advantage of using both short run and long run information. The short 
run effect measures the immediate impact that a change in Xt will have on change in Yt. On the other hand 𝜑𝑖  is the 
feedback effect or adjustment effect, and shows how much of the disequilibrium is being corrected i.e. the extent to 
which any disequilibrium in the previous period effects any adjustment. 
13 Complete list of countries is in the Appendix together with start and end date for tax revenues data. 




In Figure 2, we plot the interquartile range for total tax revenue, PIT, CIT, TGS and TT for our 
entire sample of countries (all variables expressed in percent of GDP).15 We observe that while tax 
revenues increased from the early 2000s, there have taken a tow during the Global Financial Crisis 
and relatively flat since. Zooming in into the tax components, most of the growth in tax revenues 
over the last decades has been driven particularly by increases in CIT and TGS. PIT and TT, on 
the other hand, have remained generally flat. Yet again, it is interesting to note the drop in CIT 
around 2008-09 corresponding to the particularly negative impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
on the corporate sector. In contrast, no such fall is graphically visible in the case of TGS. 
 
Figure 2. Inter-Quartile Range of Tax Revenues in Asia (percent GDP), 1980-2017 
Tax Revenue Personal Income Tax 
  




15 Country specific individual charts for total tax revenue in percent of GDP are shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix. 













































Trade Tax  
 
 
Note: Each panel plots the median (blue line) together with the 25th and 75th percentiles of the respective distributions (green and 
red lines respectively). 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Baseline Estimates 
 
Equation (7) is first estimated by means of the mean group estimator for aggregate tax 
revenues. Details of the country specific estimates are presented in Table 1. The average long run 
buoyancy estimate is 1.19 while the corresponding short run buoyancy is 1.16.  
The standard deviation is slightly larger in the short-run buoyancy than in the short run 
one. Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Pakistan, Vietnam, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
Tonga and Micronesia, all display long-run buoyancies statistically significant higher than one. 
Higher than one buoyancies for Bangladesh was also found in the study by Ahmed and Mohamed 
(2010). For Pakistan, our results are in line with those Shaikh (2012) who, looking at the period 
1974-2009, found the buoyancy of the Pakistanis tax system to be higher than unity. 16 This means 
that for these countries growth has improved fiscal sustainability over time. For the remainder list 
of countries, almost all yielded a long run buoyancy statistically not different from unity. In Japan, 
Brunei, Singapore and Thailand, the tax system has acted as a good automatic stabilizer as 
evidenced by short-run buoyancies statistically larger than one. 17  For the remainder of the 
countries, tax systems are mostly neither good nor bad automatic stabilizers. Our findings for India 
are broadly in line with Upender´s (2008) that found a buoyancy coefficient not strictly larger than 
 
16 Shaikh (2012) attributed such result to diversification and deepening of the manufacturing sector and shrinking of 
the agricultural sector. 
17 As far as Thailand is concerned, Bartolich (2005) carefully examined the country’s tax system and discussed the 













unity in the 1992 post-tax reform period. The speed of adjustment coefficient is the lowest (largest) 
in the Philippines (Tuvalu) meaning that the adjustment towards its long-term value is slow (fast). 
 
Table 1. Overall Tax Buoyancy in Asian-Pacific Countries, 1980-2017 
 
Country  Long run buoyancy Short run buoyancy Speed of Adjustment 
Japan 1.085*** 2.158*** -0.312*** 
Australia 0.953*** 0.942*** -0.151 
New Zealand 0.974*** 1.206*** -0.254** 
Bangladesh 1.207*** 0.396 -0.491*** 
Bhutan 1.236*** 1.438 -0.439*** 
Brunei Darussalam 1.565*** 2.063*** -0.597*** 
Myanmar 1.230*** -0.767 -0.590*** 
Cambodia 1.443*** 1.418*** -0.481** 
Sri Lanka 0.938*** 1.021*** -0.358** 
India 1.050*** 1.224*** -0.192 
Indonesia 0.935*** 1.059*** -0.588*** 
Laos 1.308*** 1.153*** -0.536** 
Malaysia 0.868*** 0.713** -0.485*** 
Maldives 0.994*** 1.107*** -0.217*** 
Nepal 2.779 1.125*** -0.013 
Pakistan 1.511*** 1.338*** -0.504* 
Philippines 1.059*** 1.650*** -0.185* 
Singapore 1.045*** 1.556*** -0.134 
Thailand 1.099*** 1.728*** -0.374*** 
Vietnam 1.074*** 0.797*** -0.327*** 
Solomon Islands 1.074*** 1.127*** -0.124 
Fiji 1.111*** 1.351*** -0.355** 
Kiribati 1.203*** 0.475 -0.231* 
Vanuatu 0.971*** 1.214*** -0.334*** 
Papua New Guinea 1.096*** 0.745*** -0.500*** 
Tonga 1.178*** 1.304*** -0.445*** 
Marshall Islands 1.135*** 0.911** -0.499* 
Micronesia 1.487*** 1.489* -0.996*** 
Tuvalu 1.039*** 1.981*** -1.291*** 
Mongolia 0.992*** 0.933*** -0.203* 
Note: Estimation of Equation (7) by MG estimator (see main text for details). Bold italic means statistically greater than one at 5 
percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
We repeat the same country-specific estimation of equation (7) now for the PIT, CIT, TGS 
and TT and summarize the country-specific information by constructing four histograms. Country-
specific results are displayed in the Appendix Tables A2-A5. We can observe that there are wide 
variations in the degree of buoyancy across the four tax categories. Figure 3 shows that the long-





Figure 3. Histogram of Country Specific Buoyancy Estimates (relative frequency, in 
percent) 
Personal Income Tax long-run buoyancy Personal Income Tax short-run buoyancy 
  
Corporate Income Tax long-run buoyancy Corporate Income Tax short-run buoyancy 
  
Tax on Goods and Services long-run buoyancy Tax on Goods and Services short-run buoyancy 
  
Trade Tax long-run buoyancy Trade Tax short-run buoyancy 
  
Note: LR and SR denote long-run and short-run buoyancy coefficients, respectively. 

















































































































































We continue, now with the entire panel and estimate equation (7) using data for total tax 
revenue and the four tax categories. We estimate coefficients for short-run, long-run and the speed 
of adjustment using either a MG estimator. Results shown in Table 2 suggest that, on average, 
long-run buoyancies for overall tax revenues and CIT are statistically larger than one. This means 
that CIT has contributed to improving fiscal sustainability over time. The remaining coefficients 
(including short-term buoyancies) are not statistically different from one, except in the case of 
trade taxes. Hence, between PIT, CIT or TGS there is no single best source of automatic stabilizers 
in these group of countries taken together. The speed of adjustment is the lowest (largest) in TT 
(CIT) meaning that the adjustment towards its long-term value is slow (fast). 
 
Table 2. Tax Buoyancy, Mean Group Estimator 
 
 Tax revenues PIT CIT TGS TT 
Long run buoyancy 1.159***  1.191*** 1.435*** 1.560*** 0.546** 
 (0.068)  (0.198) (0.173) (0.304) (0.213) 
Short run buoyancy 1.216***  1.452*** 1.923*** 0.939*** 0.858 
 (0.112)  (0.392) (0.496) (0.163) (0.549) 
Speed of adjustment -0.145  -0.554*** -0.560*** -0.413*** -0.385*** 
 (0.266)  (0.105) (0.096) (0.049) (0.070) 
       
Observations 911  548 575 691 704 
Note: Estimation of Equation (7) by the MG estimator (see main text for details). Bold italic means statistically greater than one 
at 5 percent level; bold means statistically not different from one at 5 percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
5.2 Sensitivity and Robustness 
 
In this sub-section we subject our baseline estimations to several sensitivity and robustness 
checks. 
 
5.2.1 Sensitivity to alternative specifications, samples and estimators 
 
We start with the use of the PMG estimator as an alternative. Redoing Table 2 with this 
estimator gets us the results displayed in Table 3. The differences are that now we get a short-run 
buoyancy for CIT statistically larger than one. Moreover, now both short and long-run buoyancy 
coefficients for TT are not statistically different from one. But overall, the tax revenue result we 




Table 3. Tax Buoyancy, Pooled Mean Group Estimator 
 
 Tax revenues PIT CIT TGS TT 
Long run buoyancy 1.082*** 1.258*** 1.490*** 1.016*** 1.007*** 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.039) (0.014) (0.020) 
Short run buoyancy 1.076*** 0.987*** 2.107*** 0.792*** 1.043*** 
 (0.143) (0.241) (0.442) (0.244) (0.337) 
Speed of adjustment -0.263*** -0.326*** -0.329*** -0.213*** -0.244*** 
 (0.048) (0.063) (0.062) (0.041) (0.040) 
      
Observations 911 548 575 691 704 
Note: Estimation of Equation (7) by the PMG estimator (see main text for details). Bold italic means statistically greater than one 
at 5 percent level; bold means statistically not different from one at 5 percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
A second sensitivity exercise concerns the fact that when estimating Equation (7), in which 
we use nominal changes in tax revenues and nominal GDP, we include both a price component 
and a real component. Adding inflation - based on the GDP deflator - as an additional control 
variable is important to assess whether tax buoyancy is independent or not from price 
developments.18 If the latter, the same relationship would be obtained if real variables were used 
instead. Results in Table 4 for TGS show that inflation enters with a significant positive coefficient, 
particularly in the long-run. Moreover, the coefficients for buoyancy are now smaller (in 
magnitude) than before. Hence, tax buoyancy does not appear neutral with respect to inflation, 
meaning that tax buoyancy in real terms is smaller than in nominal. 
  
 




Table 4. Tax Buoyancy, Mean Group Estimator, controlling for inflation 
 
 Tax revenues PIT CIT TGS TT 
Long run buoyancy  1.002*** 0.977*** 1.556*** 0.895** 0.932*** 
  (0.123) (0.100) (0.171) (0.454) (0.242) 
Short run buoyancy  1.016*** 2.723 2.370*** -2.713 -5.576 
  (0.171) (2.222) (0.669) (3.778) (5.965) 
Speed of adjustment  -0.292*** -0.574*** -0.403*** -0.410*** -0.366*** 
  (0.080) (0.186) (0.098) (0.064) (0.075) 
Long run price effect  0.810 -0.015 -0.000 0.196* -0.076 
  (1.217) (0.029) (0.020) (0.116) (0.071) 
Short run price effect  0.024 -0.010 -0.013 0.020 0.050 
  (0.287) (0.017) (0.015) (0.029) (0.042) 
Observations  908 544 573 690 702 
Note: Estimation of Equation (7) by the MG estimator (see main text for details). Bold italic means statistically greater than one 
at 5 percent level; bold means statistically not different from one at 5 percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Buoyancy of the tax system could be biased if changes in tax revenues and GDP are 
correlated with changes in tax policy parameters, such as tax rates or exemptions. To account for 
this possibility, we add to our equation (7) developments in tax rates as a control variable.19 This 
is important in light of several tax reforms enacted since the 1990s in several countries.20 Results 
including tax rates as a control are displayed in Table 5. Controlling for the top PIT rate does not 
significantly change long-run tax buoyancy estimates. For the CIT, controlling for corresponding 
tax rates, significantly increases the point estimate in the long-run (it becomes statistically larger 




19 Note, however that the country and time coverage of tax rates is smaller than that of general tax revenue data, so 
when used in regression analysis, this reduces the total number of observations. Tax rates are retrieved from the IMF´s 
Tax Policy Division database. 
20 See Ahmad and Stern for a discussion of theory and practice of tax reforms in developing countries.  
21 Note that in addition to adding inflation and tax rates as potentially important regressors to our main specification, 
other factors (e.g. capacity of tax administration, institutional quality, etc.) could also be considered. However, we 




Table 5. Tax Buoyancy of Revenue Components, controlling for tax rates 
 
 Personal Income Tax Corporate Income Tax Taxes on Goods and Services 
 No tax rate tax rate No tax rate tax rate No tax rate tax rate 
Long run buoyancy 1.191*** 0.935*** 1.435*** 1.754*** 1.560*** -1.266 
 (0.198) (0.151) (0.173) (0.346) (0.304) (2.509) 
Short run buoyancy 1.452*** 1.342*** 1.923*** 1.731** 0.939*** 0.807*** 
 (0.392) (0.395) (0.496) (0.544) (0.163) (0.214) 
Speed of adjustment -0.554*** -0.779*** -0.560*** -0.585*** -0.413*** -0.691*** 
 (0.105) (0.297) (0.096) (0.060) (0.049) (0.132) 
Observations       
 548 402 575 426 691 464 
Note: Estimation of Equation (7) by PMG estimator (see main text for details). Bold italic means statistically greater than one at 5 
percent level; bold means statistically not different from one at 5 percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 Given the long time-span covered, has the buoyancy of different taxes changed over time? 
We answer this question by splitting the time-span halfway, before and after 1999. During the 
1980s and 1990s there was little short-run action as far as tax buoyancy is concerned. For PIT, CIT 
and TT short-run buoyancy was not statistically different from zero. This changed in the most 
recent couple of decades with them becoming larger in magnitude and statistically not different 
from one. This suggested that the tax system has made progress over time. Also, in the more recent 
period long-run buoyancy for TGS is statistically larger than one, signaling that this tax component 
started contributing more towards fiscal sustainability as time went by. Little differences can be 






Table 6. Tax Buoyancy, Mean Group Estimator 
 
 Tax revenues PIT CIT TGS TT 
Time period 1980-1998 
Long run buoyancy 1.000*** 1.006*** 0.985*** 0.986** 3.058 
 (0.066) (0.176) (0.367) (0.387) (2.504) 
Short run buoyancy 1.047*** 0.745 0.678 0.891* -0.011 
 (0.153) (0.642) (0.456) (0.517) (0.948) 
Speed of adjustment -0.257 -0.673*** -0.843*** -0.726*** -0.705*** 
 (0.355) (0.167) (0.237) (0.118) (0.204) 
      
Observations 357 176 194 248 266 
Time period 1999-2017 
Long run buoyancy 1.108*** 1.238*** 0.927** 1.249*** 0.469 
 (0.062) (0.254) (0.421) (0.125) (0.333) 
Short run buoyancy 1.384*** 1.714*** 1.483*** 1.035*** 0.668 
 (0.143) (0.500) (0.413) (0.207) (0.680) 
Speed of adjustment -0.456*** -0.525*** -0.520*** -0.634*** -0.639*** 
 (0.043) (0.119) (0.067) (0.087) (0.086) 
      
Observations 425 264 290 341 343 
Note: Estimation of Equation (7) by the MG estimator (see main text for details). Bold italic means statistically greater than one 
at 5 percent level; bold means statistically not different from one at 5 percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
5.2.2 Tax Buoyancy in Good and Bad Times 
 
Now we try to understand variations in the stabilization role of taxation during periods of 
economic expansion and economic contraction. We begin with an event-study type exercise, by 
plotting the total tax revenue-to-GDP ratios (and the four tax categories considered in this paper) 
around recessions (identified as years of negative GDP growth), as well as one and two years 
before/after the episode. Looking at Figure 4, the first observation is that overall tax revenues 
decreased immediately once the recession takes place and it takes about two years to start 
recovering a bit again. Looking at the four different tax categories, PIT and TGS fall 
contemporaneously at time t while CIT falls with a lag of one period following a recession (we 
only observe a fall from t to t+1) but it recovers in t+2. Trade taxes seem generally unaffected by 






Figure 4. Tax Revenue and categories (percent of GDP) around Recessions 
 
Total Tax Revenues Personal Income Tax 
  
Corporate Income Tax Tax on Goods and Services 
  
Trade Taxes  
 
 
Note: “t” is in years and it corresponds to the average of the relevant tax revenue in the first recession year. “t+1” (“t+2”) correspond 
to the value of the ratio of the relevant tax revenue to GDP one (two) year after the beginning of the recession. Mutatis mutandis 
for “t-1” (“t-2”). 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
To empirically explore whether tax buoyancy varies depending on the phase of the business 
cycle, the following alternative short-run non-linear regression is estimated: 
 
𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖
𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∙ 𝑌(𝑧) ∙ 𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘





















































,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝛾 > 0 
 
in which 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of the state of the economy normalized to have zero mean and unit 
variance. The weights assigned to each regime vary between 0 and 1 according to the weighting 
function⁡𝐹(. ), so that 𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) can be interpreted as the probability of being in a given state of the 
economy. The coefficients 𝛽𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 and 𝛽𝑘
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
 capture the buoyancy impact at each horizon 
k in cases of extreme recessions (𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) ≈ 1 when z goes to minus infinity) and booms (1 −
𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) ≈ 1 when z goes to plus infinity), respectively.
22 We choose 𝛾 = 1.5, following Auerbach 
and Gorodnichenko (2012), so that the economy spends about 20 percent of the time in a 
recessionary regime—defined as 𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) > 0.8 . 
23   This is equivalent to the smooth transition 
autoregressive (STAR) model developed by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) to inspect 
nonlinearities.24 Compared with a model in which each dependent variable would be interacted 
with a measure of the business cycle position, an advantage of this approach is the fact that it 
permits a direct test of whether the tax buoyancy varies in recessions and expansions. By having 
the 𝐹(. ) varying across a continuum of states this makes the state-contingent buoyancy to change 
smoothly making the estimations in each state more stable and precise. 
 The question now is what to use as an indicator for the variable 𝑧𝑖𝑡? Commonly, real GDP 
growth is used as a proxy for the state of the economy. We use this as a baseline option. Then 
introduce a further innovation which is to obtain a new measure of the output gap for each country 
based on the new filtering technique suggested by Hamilton (2018). Mindful of the criticisms 
surrounding the popular use of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (such as the identification of 
spurious cycles) (Harvey and Jaeger, 1993; Cogley and Nason, 1995), Hamilton’s (2018) method 
to extract the cyclical and trend component of a generic variable 𝑥𝑡  (denoted 𝑥
𝑐
𝑡  and 𝑥
𝜏
𝑡 , 
respectively), consists of estimating the following:  
 𝑥𝑡+ℎ = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑥𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑢𝑡+ℎ
𝑘
𝑗=0  (8) 






22 𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡)=0.5 is the cutoff between weak and strong economic activity. 
23 Our results hardly change when using alternative values of the parameter 𝛾, between 1 and 6.  





The non-stationary part of the regression provides the cyclical component: 
 
 𝑥𝑡
𝑐 = 𝑢?̂?  (9) 
while the trend is given by 
 
 𝑥𝑡
𝜏 = 𝛾0̂ + ∑ 𝛾?̂? + 𝑥𝑡−ℎ−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=0   (10) 
Hamilton (2018) suggests that h and k should be chosen such that the residuals from 
equation (8) are stationary and points out that, for a broad array of processes, the fourth differences 
of a series are indeed stationary. We choose h = 2 and k = 3, which is line with the dynamics seen 
in real GDP.25 
 
Table 7. Asymmetric Short-term Buoyancy over the Business Cycle 
Type of revenue Economic Expansion Economic Recession Economic Expansion Economic Recession 
Approach  STAR based on Real GDP growth STAR based on Hamilton OG 
Tax Revenues 0.912*** 1.337*** 1.101*** 1.230*** 
 (0.057) (0.064) (0.088) (0.051) 
PIT 1.065*** 1.336*** 1.050*** 1.463*** 
 (0.307) (0.215) (0.238) (0.200) 
CIT 1.337*** 1.334*** 1.316*** 1.353*** 
 (0.214) (0.285) (0.239) (0.213) 
TGS 0.958*** 1.081*** 1.091*** 1.111*** 
 (0.242) (0.181) (0.205) (0.195) 
Trade 0.727*** 1.336*** 0.642*** 1.125*** 
 (0.156) (0.202) (0.247) (0.153) 
Note: Estimation of Equation (8). Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
 
Results are shown in Table 7. Buoyancy is generally larger during recessions than during times 
of economic expansions. This is particularly true in the cases of PIT and TT: this tax category on 
average seems to work better as automatic stabilizer in bad times compared to good times. This 
result is more broadly confirmed by Furceri and Jalles (2018) who found that the overall impact 
of fiscal stabilization (measured with a proxy of the degree of fiscal counter-cyclicality) was larger 
 




during recessionary periods. Results are qualitatively similar between the two ways to choose for 
an indicator of economic activity (either real GDP growth or the Hamilton-based output gap). 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
Over the last few decades, the different Asian tax systems experienced various changes of 
individual taxes and major reforms thought to improve overall revenue collection, improve equity 
and fairness, and stabilize the economy. However, these efforts have had differentiated impacts 
across the region. In this paper, we empirically examined the short and long run tax buoyancies of 
30 Asian-Pacific countries between 1980 and 2017 using recent panel data techniques.  
On average, in this group of countries tax revenues have been increasing over the last decades 
particularly driven by CIT and TGS, despite the negative toll following the Global Financial Crisis. 
Using Mean Group estimators, we then found that the short-run buoyancy is 1.22 and statistically 
not different from one, while the long-run buoyancy is 1.16 and statistically larger than one (driven 
by a high CIT buoyancy). In 11 out of 30 countries long run tax buoyancies are statistically 
significant higher than one. This means that for these countries, growth has improved fiscal 
sustainability over time. For the remainder set of countries, almost all yielded a long run buoyancy 
statistically not different from unity. Because over the long run revenue tend to remain constant, 
as a share of GDP,  an implication of our findings is that permanent increases in the ratio of 
spending-to-GDP (that do not improve structural conditions or human capital) should be 
accompanied by reforms aimed at mobilizing revenues, in order to avoid a permanent deterioration 
in the fiscal balance. In addition, in only 4 out of 30 countries the tax system has acted as a good 
automatic stabilizer as evidenced by short-run buoyancies statistically larger than one. The use of 
cyclically adjusted fiscal indicators could improve the efficiency of tax decision-making in these 
countries. Disaggregating tax revenues, between PIT, CIT or TGS there is no single best source of 
automatic stabilizers in these group of countries taken together. Results are robust to the estimation 
with alternative estimators, the inclusion of inflation and tax rates. We also uncovered that 
buoyancies increased in magnitude and significance over time suggesting progress in these 
countries´ tax systems. Finally, resorting to nonlinear estimations of short-run buoyancies 




recessions than during times of economic expansions (this is particularly true in the cases of PIT 
and TT). 
A highly buoyant tax structure is important for any Asian country since it implies that tax 
revenue could increase without tampering with the tax rates and, hence, avoid tax evasion and 
undesired political consequences. It is essential for policy-makers to know which tax handle is 
more buoyant since heavier reliance on such taxes enhances the overall buoyancy of the system. 
A tax buoyancy coefficient lower than one may point towards problems related to the tax structure, 
administration or compliance. In countries characterized by low buoyancies, tax authorities should 
improve tax information systems to prevent tax evasion, enhance the evaluation of its performance 
and facilitate adequate macroeconomic planning and implementation. Moreover, measures need 
to be put in place to ensure a broader tax base. Such measures may include creating an enabling 
business environment for companies to flourish, making effort at improving productivity and 
wages, reducing personal income allowances and fringe benefits, rationalizing tax exemptions and 
identifying new items to bring into the tax net.  
Future work could consider estimating time-varying buoyancies to better inspect the time 
dynamics and also provide country-year estimates that could be used in a fully-fledged panel to 
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List of countries  
(in parenthesis start and end date of tax revenue data) 
 
Japan (1980-2017), Australia (1980-2017), New Zealand (1980-2017), Bangladesh (1984-2017), 
Bhutan (1983-2017), Brunei Darussalam (1990-2017), Myanmar (1980-2017), Cambodia (1994-
2017), Sri Lanka (1980-2017), India (1980-2017), Indonesia (1980-2017), Laos (1990-2017), 
Malaysia (1980-2017), Maldives (1980-2017), Nepal (1980-2017), Pakistan (1980-2017), 
Philippines (1987-2017), Singapore (1980-2017), Thailand (1980-2017), Vietnam (1980-2017), 
Solomon Islands (1981-2017), Fiji (1980-2017), Kiribati (1980-2017), Vanuatu (1981-2017), 
Papua New Guinea (1983-2017), Tonga (1981-2017), Marshall  Islands (1986-2017), Micronesia 





Table A1. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean  Standard deviation Minimum  Maximum  
Tax revenues 991 15.61 6.83 1.91 37.57 
PIT 666 3.43 4.28 0 21.52 
CIT 656 3.37 3.61 0 32.05 
Tax Goods and Services 761 5.62 2.96 0 13.88 
Trade Taxes 780 2.90 2.76 0 14.45 
Growth real GDP 1380 4.30 4.22 -15.43 36.53 
Inflation (deflator based) 1377 8.42 23.14 -37.92 487.17 
PIT rate 816 32.7 3.81 26.91 39.24 
CIT rate 816 29.8 3.75 23.90 37.13 
VAT rate 714 16.00 0.18 15.67 16.44 









Table A2. PIT Buoyancy in Asian-Pacific Countries, 1980-2017 
 
Country Long run buoyancy Short run buoyancy Speed of Adjustment 
Japan 0.868*** 2.241*** -0.256*** 
Australia 0.911*** 1.017*** -0.265** 
New Zealand 0.764*** 1.270*** -0.361*** 
Bangladesh 0.881*** 8.560** -0.562*** 
Bhutan 1.145*** 1.949 -0.376** 
Brunei Darussalam    
Myanmar 5.219 4.626*** -0.089 
Cambodia 2.301*** 1.059 -0.571*** 
Sri Lanka 0.771*** 1.146* -0.325*** 
India 1.270*** 1.467*** -0.557*** 
Indonesia    
Laos 1.270*** 1.580*** -0.553*** 
Malaysia 0.878*** -0.201 -0.382 
Maldives    
Nepal 1.032*** 1.107 -0.467*** 
Pakistan 1.059*** 0.410*** -0.320 
Philippines 1.122*** 2.825*** -0.382*** 
Singapore 1.626*** 3.590*** -2.425*** 
Thailand 1.047*** 0.704* -0.356*** 
Vietnam 1.452*** 0.648 -0.466** 
Solomon Islands 1.470*** 1.492*** -0.353** 
Fiji 0..402** 0.308 -0.446* 
Kiribati 0.053 1.456 -0.730** 
Vanuatu    
Papua New Guinea 1.209*** 0.028 -0.222* 
Tonga    
Marshall Islands 1.239*** -0.489 -1.060* 
Micronesia 1.176 0.329 -0.185 
Tuvalu -0.566 -1.722 -1.901*** 
Mongolia 1.163*** 0.891*** -0.263 
Note: Estimation of Equation (10) by MG estimator (see main text for details). Bold italic means statistically greater than one at 5 
percent level; bold means statistically not different from one at 5 percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote 





Table A3. CIT Buoyancy in Asian-Pacific Countries, 1980-2017 
 
Country Long run buoyancy Short run buoyancy Speed of Adjustment 
Japan 1.120*** 5.438*** -0.472*** 
Australia 1.405*** 2.164*** -0.274** 
New Zealand 1.422*** 2.413*** -0.555*** 
Bangladesh 1.996*** 1.366 -0.509* 
Bhutan 1.467*** 2.016 -0.278** 
Brunei Darussalam 1.701*** 2.196*** -0.803*** 
Myanmar    
Cambodia 1.934*** 1.357 -0.513** 
Sri Lanka 0.951*** 0.980 -0.411*** 
India 1.586*** 1.674** -0.098 
Indonesia    
Laos 1.235*** 1.055*** -0.293* 
Malaysia 0.831*** -0.800* -0.487*** 
Maldives 1.554*** 0.344 -0.108 
Nepal 1.779*** -0.467 -0.266*** 
Pakistan    
Philippines 1.278*** 1.762** -0.646*** 
Singapore 1.261 4.174 -1.069 
Thailand 1.587*** 3.068*** -0.293*** 
Vietnam 0.284 0.864 -0.065 
Solomon Islands 1.540*** 2.861*** -0.363* 
Fiji 1.066*** -0.622 -0.626*** 
Kiribati -0.474 -2.415 -0.554 
Vanuatu    
Papua New Guinea 1.600*** 0.851* -0.144 
Tonga    
Marshall Islands 1.131*** 5.815 -2.349 
Micronesia 1.923*** -0.118 -0.746*** 
Tuvalu 4.690* 9.820*** -1.357*** 
Mongolia 0.997*** 2.270*** -0.716*** 
Note: Estimation of Equation (10) by MG estimator (see main text for details). Bold italic means statistically greater than one at 5 
percent level; bold means statistically not different from one at 5 percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote 





Table A4. TGS Buoyancy in Asian-Pacific Countries, 1980-2017 
 
Country Long run buoyancy Short run buoyancy Speed of Adjustment 
Japan 0.995 0.712** -0.035 
Australia 0.725** 0.348 -0.111 
New Zealand 1.086*** 1.134*** -0.192* 
Bangladesh 1.119*** 1.784 -0.414 
Bhutan 1.109*** 1.703 -0.602*** 
Brunei Darussalam 0.704*** 0.311* -0.877*** 
Myanmar 1.622 -2.516 -0.260 
Cambodia 1.625*** 1.811*** -0.795*** 
Sri Lanka 0.913*** 0.650** -0.183*** 
India 0.967*** 0.741*** -0.191 
Indonesia 0.741*** 0.341 -0.761*** 
Laos 1.354*** 1.164*** -0.434 
Malaysia 1.007*** 0.958 -0.238 
Maldives 0.976*** 1.144** -0.223*** 
Nepal -0.285 1.164*** 0.013 
Pakistan 1.680*** 0.995** -1.074*** 
Philippines 0.935*** 0.486 -0.373** 
Singapore 1.045*** 1.489*** -0.592*** 
Thailand 1.075*** 1.269*** -0.462*** 
Vietnam 0.992*** 1.638*** -0.702*** 
Solomon Islands 1.807*** 1.516* -0.469*** 
Fiji 1.382*** 2.399*** -0.390*** 
Kiribati    
Vanuatu 1.578*** 0.891** -0.359*** 
Papua New Guinea 1.576*** 0.212 -0.408*** 
Tonga 2.857*** 1.013 -0.416** 
Marshall Islands 4.304 1.525* -0.262 
Micronesia    
Tuvalu 8.726 0.564 -0.499 
Mongolia 1.061*** 0.824*** -0.248* 
Note: Estimation of Equation (10) by MG estimator (see main text for details). Bold italic means statistically greater than one at 5 
percent level; bold means statistically not different from one at 5 percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote 





Table A5. Trade Taxes Buoyancy in Asian-Pacific Countries, 1980-2017 
 
Country Long run buoyancy Short run buoyancy Speed of Adjustment 
Japan 0.769*** 2.084*** -0.395*** 
Australia 2.801 0.817 -0.016 
New Zealand 0.952*** 1.099 -0.248** 
Bangladesh 0.879*** 1.829 -0.442 
Bhutan 1.060*** -2.543 -0.344*** 
Brunei Darussalam 0.197* -0.225 -1.013*** 
Myanmar 0.429** -12.602** -1.269*** 
Cambodia 0.944*** 1.554** -0.327** 
Sri Lanka 0.954*** 1.287** -0.141 
India 0.766*** 2.449*** -0.316*** 
Indonesia 0.551 2.097* -0.571 
Laos 1.023*** 0.708*** -0.844*** 
Malaysia 0.023 2.026*** -0.371** 
Maldives 0.852*** 1.103*** -0.204*** 
Nepal 1.101*** 0.856** -0.321** 
Pakistan 1.447*** 1.645*** -1.039*** 
Philippines 0.913*** 0.720 -0.249** 
Singapore -1.409 1.427 -0.186 
Thailand 0.537*** 2.627*** -0.197*** 
Vietnam 0.594*** -0.318 -0.384*** 
Solomon Islands 0.703*** 1.062 -0.223* 
Fiji 1.225*** 1.302*** -0.222** 
Kiribati -0.441*** 0.996** -1.03*** 
Vanuatu 0.049 1.542*** -0.142 
Papua New Guinea 0.307** 1.098 -0.284* 
Tonga 0.164 0.551 -0.116 
Marshall Islands 1.402 1.034 -0.365 
Micronesia    
Tuvalu -4.140*** 6.763*** 0.696 
Mongolia 1.180*** 1.863*** -0.589*** 
Note: Estimation of Equation (10) by MG estimator (see main text for details). Bold italic means statistically greater than one at 5 
percent level; bold means statistically not different from one at 5 percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote 








































































































































































































































1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Australia Bangladesh Bhutan Brunei Darussalam Cambodia Fiji
India Indonesia Japan Kiribati Lao People's Dem.Rep Malaysia
Maldives Marshall Islands Micronesia Mongolia Myanmar Nepal
New Zealand Palau Papua New Guinea Philippines Singapore Solomon Islands
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